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PRIVACY LAW: POSITIVE THEORY AND NORMATIVE 
PRACTICE 
Anita L. Allen 
Professor Lior Strahilevitz’s article Toward a Positive Theory of 
Privacy Law urges novel positive approaches to privacy law scholar-
ship.1  Positive theories of law employ empirical and analytical me-
thods to describe what the law is, how it came to be, and what its con-
sequences may be.  Grounded in median voter models and public 
choice theory generally,2 Strahilevitz’s article illustrates positive analy-
sis, illuminating distributive implications of privacy statutes and com-
mon law privacy doctrines for a range of groups, including political 
elites, racial minorities, criminal offenders, naïve and sophisticated 
consumers, data miners, and marketers.  The overall goals of this in-
sightful article are to clarify the distributive “winners and losers” of 
privacy law and to shed light on the predictability of who prevails in 
the institutions that formulate privacy rules in the United States and in 
Europe.3   
By contrast to Strahilevitz’s positive project, my recent work on 
privacy law has been normative in thrust.  Specifically, I have explored 
the normative ethical value of privacy, evaluated the normative ethics 
of privacy laws, and pondered the extent of normative ethical obliga-
tions to protect one’s own and others’ privacy.4  Though a normativist, 
I welcome greater attention to positive theory.  Positive theory and 
normative theory go hand-in-hand, in my view.  Normative theories of 
law evaluate and commend laws by reference to values that the laws 
embody or promote.  Information management policies reflected in law 
are subject to evaluation by economists as efficient or inefficient, but 
by ethicists as right or wrong, good or bad, virtuous or vicious, and 
just or unjust. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 Lior Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010 (2013). 
 2 See generally DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 
(1958); Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decisionmaking, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23 (1948). 
 3 Cf. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902 (2009); James Q. 
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 
(2004) (accounting for EU/U.S. privacy law differences). 
 4 ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE (2011); see also Anita 
L. Allen, Natural Law, Slavery, and the Right to Privacy Tort, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1187 (2012) 
(arguing that common law historically aimed to protect natural and human privacy rights); Anita 
L. Allen, Meador Lecture in Morality: Is There a Duty to Protect Your Own Privacy, 64 ALA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (assessing claim of ethical duty to safeguard own privacy). 
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We cannot know if we are doing the right thing, if we do not know 
what we are doing and whom we are doing it to.  My work often at-
tends to the winners of losers of privacy rules and practices — whether 
corporations, women, the LGBT community, criminals locked in pris-
ons, African Americans, or children.  Whether privacy is a good thing 
for the people who have it is a question with a large empirical dimen-
sion.  For the sake of rigor and completeness, normative ethical theo-
rizing must attend to subtle concrete distributional effects of the sort 
Strahilevitz examined.  Attending with special care to distributive im-
plications serves the needs of ethics, as it serves the needs of other 
normative enterprises of perhaps more immediate concern to Strahile-
vitz — welfare-enhancing cost-benefit policy analysis and commercial 
advantage-seeking.  Understanding those that Strahilevitz terms the  
“winners and losers” of privacy law bears on the choices that persons 
of conscience, character, and goodwill make respecting the frequency, 
content, and context of data acquisition, data disclosure, and data re-
tention. 
Yet the truth about distributional effects may be subtle, unob-
served, and disbelieved.  Presumed winners may be losers, and the 
presumed losers may be winners.  Presumptions about winners and 
losers may be so fixed in prejudice that no one bothers to challenge 
philosophical assumptions with fresh analytics or factual pieties with 
rigorously derived empirical data.  I applaud Professor Strahilevitz’s 
illustrations of new ways to think empirically about privacy laws’ dis-
tributive effects.  Here, I briefly comment on his major arguments and 
examples.  First, in Part I, I comment on his claims concerning the law 
of celebrity privacy, and I offer a challenge to his conception of win-
ners and losers in that domain.  Second, in Part II, I consider his ar-
gument that granular criminal-history disclosures may be the direction 
for the near future and may benefit African Americans more than 
criminal-history privacy.  I suggest that privacy-reducing surveillance 
of African Americans may already be so extensive that African Ameri-
cans would not view themselves as “winners” under a regime that 
placed detailed criminal-history data in the hands of employers.  
Third, in Part III, I address privacy concerns raised by Big Data, not-
ing grounds for a concerned response to the data mining and consum-
er-profiling practices artfully described by Strahilevitz.  Finally, in Part 
IV I respond to Strahilevitz’s celebratory response to the federal Do 
Not Call registry’s privacy implications with the observation that a 
benignly more paternalistic Do Not Call law could have made tele-
phone customers even bigger winners.  In sum, I embrace Strahile-
vitz’s call for nuanced positive theories of privacy law’s “winners and 
losers” but for a reason he does not highlight: better positive theory is 
critical also for better normative ethical theory.  I reject his specific 
characterizations of “winners and losers” of the law of celebrity public-
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ity and criminal-history disclosure, and I suggest policy directions for 
bigger wins for American shoppers and consumers. 
I.  VIRTUOUS INATTENTION 
Californians enacted an anti-paparazzi statute after the deaths of 
Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed,5 which were initially attributed to 
their chauffeur’s attempt to evade encroaching paparazzi.  The law 
forbade recording celebrities’ activities near their homes; more recent 
laws outlaw high-speed chases and intrusive photography.6  Describing 
California as an exception, Strahilevitz points out correctly that under 
U.S. law, readers and the media are generally permitted wide access to 
information about celebrities.  The law of the United Kingdom and 
Continental Europe resembles California law.  Celebrated public fig-
ures are often accorded the protection of privacy rights, including the 
fundamental rights set by the European Convention on Human 
Rights.7  Why the antipopulism of California’s and Europe’s law?  
Strahilevitz’s answer is an observation about power and influence. 
According to Strahilevitz, popular celebrity Californians (like for-
mer Governor and film star Arnold Schwarzenegger) swayed legisla-
tors and median voters.  Wealthy and elite Californians thus “won” at 
the expense of the ordinary literate public with a taste for celebrity 
gossip.  In a move from strictly positive theory toward normative ref-
lection, Strahilevitz questions whether the law ought to make privacy 
winners of those who so often win, when it could distribute a win to 
less politically and economically powerful consumers (and the for-
profit media interests that sell to them).  He does not reach the deep 
ethical questions raised by his example, however.  I suggest we ask 
whether the distribution of publication and readership rights to non-
elites makes non-elites “winners” worthy of the name.  Indeed, moral 
theorists might call for restraint in attention to others’ intimate lives.  
The individual readers who win the ability to access celebrities’ per-
sonal lives may lose from the point of view of perfectionist conceptions 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 Princess Diana of Wales died on August 31, 1997, from injuries sustained in an automobile 
accident in the Pont de l’Alma road tunnel in Paris.  On January 1, 1999, California Civil Code 
1708.8, the first anti-paparazzi statute, went into effect.  The law prohibits recording and photo-
graphing celebrities in and around their homes.  Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 (West 2012).  A second 
anti-paparazzi law enacted in 2005 provided penalties for assaults in the course of celebrity-
chasing.  Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(c) (West 2012).  Later laws increased penalties for using images 
obtained as a result of invading privacy. 
 6 See sources cited supra note 5. 
 7 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 8 (“Right to respect for private and family life”) of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence.”). 
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of virtue.8  A balance of inattention to others’ personal lives and atten-
tion to one’s own is arguably a moral virtue.  Kantian-style concep-
tions of perfect and imperfect duties to the self include duties of self-
improvement and self-respect.9  Feeding raw desires and fan obses-
sions at the expense of nontrivial activities has moral implications.  In-
attention to others’ personal lives may also be a qualitative benefit to 
civil society.  Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis made a point along 
these lines about the loss to civil society that comes from privacy inva-
sions: the market for gossip represents a qualitative decline in cultural 
life, “a lowering of social standards and of morality.”10  Their prose 
was high-minded: “Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought 
and delicacy of feeling.  No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous im-
pulse can survive under its blighting influence.”11  It could be best to 
let celebrities have their privacy since, what conservative political 
theorist Robert George calls the “moral ecology” of our society may 
suffer if the populace grows coarsely inquisitive and celebrities are 
egregiously abused.12 
II.  TRANSPARENCY AS RACISM 
The Supreme Court once blessed the notion that people have a 
strong privacy interest in their criminal histories, strong enough to de-
feat media efforts to obtain rap sheets prepared by the Justice De-
partment.13  Common law courts have noted that criminal-history 
secrecy facilitates rehabilitation and reintegration.14  Against the grain 
of such thinking, Strahilevitz argues that granular criminal-history 
disclosures may make winners of African Americans without criminal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 See generally Steven Wall, Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries 
/perfectionism-moral/. 
 9 Robert Johnson, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY (2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/kant-moral/. 
 10 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 11 Id. at 196. 
 12 ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 1 (1995). 
 13 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 
(1989) (holding that the media were not entitled under FOIA to obtain  “rap sheets” compiled by 
FBI, even though criminal history is publicly available in uncompiled forms).  Inconvenience se-
crets criminal histories in “practical obscurity”.  See id. at 762.  
 14 See Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971), overruled by Gates v. 
Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004) (“Another factor militating in favor of pro-
tecting the individual’s privacy here is the state’s interest in the integrity of the rehabilitative 
process.  Our courts recognized this issue four decades ago in Melvin v. Reid.  There, plaintiff had 
been a prostitute.  She was charged with murder and acquitted after a long and very public trial.  
She thereafter abandoned her life of shame, married, and assumed a place in respectable society, 
making many friends who were not aware of the incidents of her earlier life.”  Id. at 40 (citation 
omitted)). 
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backgrounds and losers of white ex-offenders.  A policy of making 
publicly available detailed criminal-history information might be pre-
sumed to make African Americans losers because African Americans 
are disproportionately convicted of crimes.  Although “bad informa-
tion” may be discounted by time, criminal histories are a long-term 
burden affecting where ex-offenders can live and work.  Strahilevitz 
argues that a policy of disclosure could benefit blacks — and the more 
granular the disclosures the better.  Supplied with criminal histories, 
potential employers can distinguish serious offenders from those who 
have not offended at all or trivially.  More granularity can reveal that 
a felony was mere possession of marijuana rather than armed robbery, 
rape, or homicide.  The ability to discern and discriminate removes 
any rational incentive for employers to use race as a proxy for crimi-
nality.  Loss of privacy might confer on African Americans competi-
tiveness in the market for jobs.  The privacy losers, on a closer look, 
turn out to be the winners.  
Assume with Strahilevitz that employers use white race as a proxy 
for honesty, reliability, and skill, resulting in squeaky-clean African 
Americans losing opportunities to whites who may harbor secret crim-
inal histories.  There is likely more than one way to address the prob-
lem of resource- and power-holders’ “rational” racial profiling.  Before 
pursuing policies that decrease privacy on a premise of intractable 
black criminality, should come (1) attacks on the inequities that ac-
count for black criminality in the first place, (2) a solid understanding 
of how criminal-history disclosures impact rehabilitation and the rein-
tegration of ex-offenders, and (3) clarity about the aggregation problem 
of numerous small privacy losses aggregating into an enormous sur-
veillance and transparency burden for African Americans.  The sur-
veillance society is doubly such for low-income people living in high-
crime communities and reliant on government benefits, services, and 
public and military employment.  The state collects detailed informa-
tion about individuals, families, living arrangements, health, and fi-
nancial resources.  Many African Americans are heavily supervised at 
work, watched in stores to deter shoplifting, scrutinized, and profiled 
when they drive their cars or walk outside their neighborhoods.15  
African Americans might in important respects be better off in a socie-
ty of trust and fairness than in a suspicious and biased society that 
arms the public with access to criminal histories.  As Strahilevitz sug-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 African Americans’ privacy and bodily integrity is one of the concerns civil libertarians 
raised respecting police deployment of “stop and frisk” and “stop and identify” powers.  See, e.g., 
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND FRISK (2012), available at http:// 
stopandfrisk.org/the-human-impact-report.pdf; see also Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling 
of African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 439 (2004).  
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gests, there might be a political backlash of sorts against the increasing 
granularity of criminal-history disclosures that offend the sensibilities 
of median voters.  A public choice theory positive account of winners 
and losers might suggest to African American interest groups effective 
strategies for promoting privacy rules that make a net positive contri-
bution to their constituents’ lives. 
African Americans are not always better off with more information 
privacy, however.  Not having certain information privacies benefits 
historically subordinated groups.16  A failed 2002 “Racial Privacy” re-
ferendum would have made losers of California’s racial minorities.  
The proponents of the referendum claimed that an amendment to the 
California constitution barring state racial data collection would have 
ushered in color-blind practices that would make winners of every-
one.17  However, giving up so-called racial privacy helped minorities 
acquire access to health and education goods vitally needed by their 
communities.18  Moreover, racial privacy is an illusory concept.  Race 
is a social construct with public historical, associational, and phenotyp-
ical dimensions.  Race is “in the face” and seeking to privatize it the 
way one privatizes the results of a blood test makes little practical 
sense.19  Giving up so-called racial privacy makes winners of African 
Americans, while the giving up of criminal-history privacy may not. 
III.  BIG DATA, BIG PERSONALITY, AND CONSUMER PRIVACY 
Policymakers and privacy theorists need to understand the implica-
tions that Big Data has for information privacy. “Big Data” is a nick-
name for enterprises that collect, analyze, package, and sell data, even 
uninteresting-looking data, to reveal tastes, habits, personality, and 
market behavior.  Big Data is challenging traditional privacies.20  Pri-
vate sector surveillance is rampant, introducing research about perso-
nality assessment and classification into the legal literature.21  Increa-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 ALLEN, supra note 4, at 155. 
 17 Id. at 131. 
 18 See, e.g., So-Called “Racial Privacy” Initiative Will Fail to Qualify for November 2002 Bal-
lot, ACLU N. CAL. (May 30, 2002), https://www.aclunc.org/news/press_releases/so-called_racial 
_privacy_initiative_will_fail_to_qualify_for_november_2002_ballot.shtml (“The initiative, which 
would bar public agencies in California from utilizing information that refers to race, ethnicity or 
national origin, is the brainchild of Ward Connerly, a Pete Wilson appointee to the UC Board of 
Regents.  Opponents argue that the initiative would devastate the state’s public health and educa-
tion programs, and rob the state of information about its progress in rooting out disparities based 
on ethnicity and race.”). 
 19 ALLEN, supra note 4, at 143. 
 20 Anita L. Allen, Commercial Speech Bruises Health Privacy in the Supreme Court, 41 HAST-
INGS CENTER REP. 8, 9 (2011) (suggesting that data mining may jeopardize medical privacy).  
 21 Strahilevitz, supra note 1, at 2023.  
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singly, the personality and psychology of individual consumers are 
probed without their knowledge or consent. 
Big Data, Strahilevitz observes, represents a shift from nondiscri-
minating, pooling equilibriums to controversial discriminating, sepa-
rating equilibriums in marketing.22  Big Data is enabled by the prom-
ise of efficiencies that include the capacity cheaply to ascertain who is 
a suitable purchaser of goods and products, output maximization, and 
producer surplus.  Strahilevitz focuses on what he calls the “secondary” 
rather than “primary” effects of information rules governing consumer 
retail transactions.  Primary effects relate to how the collection, mani-
pulation, and disclosure of information affect individuals whose data is 
collected and disclosed.  Secondary effects are the consequences of da-
ta collection, manipulation, and disclosures, whether or not expe-
rienced as individual harm.  Both primary and secondary effects of 
privacy laws have implications that positive theorists will want to de-
scribe and normative theorists will want to evaluate. 
Big Data’s thirst for information and capacity to learn from it 
threatens privacy.  Big Data information extractions are offensive to 
principled privacy lovers even when, as in the pharmacy data at issue 
in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,23 most sensitive personal information 
has been scrubbed using anonymization.  Privacy advocates’ concerns 
include concerns about re-identification of de-identified data and the 
loss of trust in confidential relationships.  Ought we jump on the pri-
vacy bandwagon? 
Strahilevitz answers with analysis and facts, not norms.  He main-
tains that protecting privacy seems to thwart price and service dis-
crimination that is consistent with consumer welfare.  Without privacy, 
Amazon can tell you what you want before you know what you want.  
Products can be marketed to those likely to want them, and, if credit is 
extended, people can be relied upon to pay.  Collecting consumer data 
and engaging in personality discrimination might make winners of cer-
tain shoppers no less than for-profit data miners.  Data miners win if 
they can guide efficient marketing.  Shoppers win if they are offered 
attractive discounts and premiums based on data demonstrating relia-
bility and creditworthiness.  (It turns out that buying felt pads to pro-
tect your furniture from scratches and dents predicts credit worthiness.)24 
The general public is not a clear winner of data accessibility and 
manipulation by Big Data, economically or otherwise.  In theory rely-
ing on information gleaned from data mining or consumer personality 
testing will lead to lower costs, and lower costs for business could 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 Id. at 18.  
 23 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 24 Strahilevitz, supra note 1, at 2021.  
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mean lower prices for consumers.  Yet data miners and retailers will 
not necessarily lower prices.  When do powerful business interests pass 
on profits to consumers?  When there is competition?  We need to 
know a great deal about the industries in question to predict likely 
winners and losers.   
Strahilevitz suggests an interesting political alliance between Big 
Data and sophisticated consumers.  Sophisticated consumers are the 
wealthier, better-educated, voting consumers with excellent credit and 
wholesome habits who think they have nothing to lose from policies 
that put volumes of data into the hands of firms.  According to Stahi-
levitz, a median voter model predicts that American law will systemat-
ically favor the interests of sophisticated consumers, which are congru-
ent with those of data miners, since sophisticated consumers are on the 
whole more politically engaged people who pay attention to legislative 
policy proposals and vote their interests.25 
The Lisbon Treaty may widen the divide between U.S. and EU 
approaches to data mining.  The treaty protects all data as a matter of 
fundamental right.26  Legislative lobbying by Big Data in the U.S. is 
not impeded by doctrines of fundamental right.  My observation is in 
line with Strahilevitz’s that the presence of a tradition of powerful in-
dustry lobbying in the U.S. predicts fewer restrictions on Big Data.  
He argues that a lack of such a tradition may help explain why, even 
though EU and U.S. persons have similar privacy tastes, EU law is 
significantly more prohibitive. 
Power and interest group dynamics may also explain why Big Data 
and major firms have been successful fighting consumer information 
privacy claims in the U.S. courts interpreting commercial free speech 
doctrines.27  Few relationships are as surrounded by traditions of con-
fidentiality and privacy as the physician-patient relationship.  In Sor-
rell, consistent with Strahilevitz’s positive theory, the Supreme Court 
nonetheless struck down a state law limiting data miners’ access to 
confidential physician prescription information, on the ground that 
singling out data miners with a disabling law violated their commer-
cial free speech rights. 
However, the precise nature of median voter, power, and interest 
group dynamics is not always easy to discern in interactions among 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 Id. at 2032. 
 26 Under the EU Lisbon Treaty, the protection of personal data is recognized as a fundamental 
right.  Article 16B of the Treaty provides: “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal 
data concerning them.”  Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Trea-
ty Establishing the European Community art. 16B, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 51. 
 27 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2656; U.S. West Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that commercial speech rights under First Amendment bar state action to limit access to  
information). 
2013] PRIVACY LAW 249 
Congress, the federal courts, federal agency privacy regulators, the big 
business sector, voters, and consumers.  Consider the following exam-
ples.  A common contrast between EU and U.S. privacy law is that 
our sectoral laws typically permit consumers to consent to disclosures 
of personal information by default, simply by not affirmatively “opting 
out”.  The U.S. “opt-out” bias seems to favor data sharing–hungry 
American businesses, since consumers rarely bother to affirmatively 
opt out.  In the late 1990s when Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) regulators attempted to impose a stricter “opt-in” consent re-
quirement for the disclosure of sensitive customer proprietary network 
information (CPNI),28 the telecom firm U.S. West, Inc. took them to 
court.  U.S. West prevailed in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals with 
the argument that the FCC’s preferred opt-in consent requirement vi-
olated “the First Amendment by restricting its ability to engage in 
commercial speech with customers” and raised “serious Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause concerns because CPNI represents valuable 
property that belongs to the carriers and the regulations greatly dimi-
nish its value.”29  Positive theory could potentially explain why a fed-
eral court interpreted the Constitution so as to make the telecom in-
dustry the owners of CPNI, defined as “information of, and relating 
to . . . customers”30 and why the court refused to allow federal regula-
tors to act aggressively and beneficently as guardians of consumer pri-
vacy.  Yet the contours of an explanation in terms of power dynamics 
and median voter alliances here is far from obvious.  In the CPNI 
case, the 10th Circuit sided with industry against the government; but 
in the Do Not Call registry case, the 10th Circuit sided with the gov-
ernment against industry.  The Court upheld the right of the FTC to 
create the Do Not Call registry, over objections from the telemarketing 
industry that Congress had not authorized the FTC to act and that 
such a move would deliver a profitable blow to a productive industry 
that was also a major employer.31  
IV.  HOLD THE CALLS, FORGET THE NOTICES! 
Finally, Strahilevitz touches on design mechanism in the enactment 
of the federal Do Not Call rules.32  Do Not Call rules (Rules) enforced 
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) make losers of commercial 
telemarketers but winners of telephone consumers, both consumers 
annoyed by unsolicited phone calls (they can easily opt out) and con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 U.S. West, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1228. 
 29 Id. at 1230. 
 30 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) (2006)). 
 31 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).  
 32 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 6101–6155 (2006)). 
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sumers who enjoy calls (they need do nothing).  Under the Rules, con-
sumers who choose to place their numbers on a Do Not Call registry 
maintained by the FTC are entitled to a reduction in nonpolitical, 
noncharity calls by businesses with whom they have no preexisting re-
lationship.  The Rules pass a cost-benefit test: they are significantly 
welfare-enhancing at a low cost.  Assuming that welfare implications 
are relevant to the desirability of privacy protections, we have norma-
tive grounds for praising the Rules.  
Professor Strahilevitz’s positive analysis of winners and losers 
should be expanded to include all of them: telephone users, people who 
live with them who also suffer the distraction of unwanted calls, chari-
ties, politicians, prior businesses patronized, and telemarketers.  Wel-
fare improvements were realized with the Rules, but I argue elsewhere 
that a more paternalistic policy would have been more welfare enhanc-
ing.33  Policymakers with a broader understanding of the public’s pri-
vacy interests might have banned most telemarketing calls, doing away 
with the need for an opt-in registry and imposing beneficial privacy at 
home on phone customers. 
The general consensus among privacy scholars is that the Do Not 
Call registry law was a good privacy law at the time it was enacted.  I 
surmise that most would agree with Strahilevitz that the telemarketing 
Rules were as welfare enhancing.  But not all of the privacy law inno-
vations of the 2000s have been met with a similar appreciation.  Many 
privacy scholars and officials bluntly denigrate the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley34 (GLB) financial privacy law as a foolish law that “only law-
yers could love”.35  GLB was not designed to be a robust privacy law.  
GLB was Title V of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 
demolishing walls between insurance, investment, and commercial 
banking.  GLB is not stupid relative to its actual purpose of giving 
consumers some control over who has access to sensitive financial 
transactions and related personal information.36  What subjects the 
law to ridicule is that it requires written notices few read or act on.  
The notices offer an opportunity for opting out of certain third-party 
disclosures of some personal information.  So few understand the op-
portunity and take time to exploit it that the notices reduce to useless 
formalism.37 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 See ALLEN, supra note 4, at 36–37. 
 34 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, Title V, 113 Stat. 1338, 1436 (1999) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006)). 
 35 Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at The Privacy 2001 Confe-
rence (Oct. 4, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.shtm. 
 36 Accord Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. 
L. REV. 1263 (2002). 
 37 See generally Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Infor-
mation Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (2002). 
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If Congress or agency regulators wanted seriously to limit access by 
financial institutions to consumer data, a flat ban on sharing even with 
consent would have been enacted.  One has to assume that Congress 
and regulators made self-conscious policy choices to allow firms access 
to sensitive information about consumers, for the good of those firms, 
the economy, consumers, and/or the nation.  A full positive analysis of 
the design mechanism and the distributive implications of the policy 
implemented via GLB would be useful; consumers do not benefit and 
firms waste money.  GLB regulations require privacy notices, but it 
bears emphasis that GLB also requires data safeguards and penalizes 
pretexting.  Whatever the critique of the notices requirement, the secu-
rity safeguards and antipretexting rules require their own separate pos-
itive assessments. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The central observation of Lior Strahilevitz’s paper is sound: pri-
vacy rules have distributive implications.  With careful empirical in-
vestigation and analysis we can better ascertain the true “winners and 
losers” of our privacy laws.  But how should we really understand 
“winning” and “losing”?  The winners and losers in the thin distribu-
tional senses at play in Strahilevitz’s article may not be winners and 
losers from ethical points of view he does not broach.  Is it enough that 
a distribution furthers wealth maximization, or equalizes social power? 
Should we strive to enact policies that defy power and influence; that 
look to fundamental human rights rather than preferences and desires?  
There is plenty of work for philosophers in sorting through and inter-
preting the distributive implications of privacy rules.  The question of 
individual responsibility in all of this — what ought I do in light of 
positive distributive consequences — is one of those calling out for fur-
ther inquiry. 
